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Abstract
Reinforcement learning (RL) is a general paradigm for studying intel-
ligent behaviour, with applications ranging from artificial intelligence to
psychology and economics. AIXI is a universal solution to the RL prob-
lem; it can learn any computable environment. A technical subtlety of
AIXI is that it is defined using a mixture over semimeasures that need
not sum to 1, rather than over proper probability measures. In this work
we argue that the shortfall of a semimeasure can naturally be interpreted
as the agent’s estimate of the probability of its death. We formally define
death for generally intelligent agents like AIXI, and prove a number of
related theorems about their behaviour. Notable discoveries include that
agent behaviour can change radically under positive linear transforma-
tions of the reward signal (from suicidal to dogmatically self-preserving),
and that the agent’s posterior belief that it will survive increases over
time.
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1
“That Suicide may often be consistent with interest and with our duty
to ourselves, no one can question, who allows, that age, sickness, or
misfortune may render life a burthen, and make it worse even than
annihilation.”
— Hume, Of Suicide (1777)
1 Introduction
Reinforcement Learning (RL) has proven to be a fruitful theoretical framework
for reasoning about the properties of generally intelligent agents [3]. A good the-
oretical understanding of these agents is valuable for several reasons. Firstly,
it can guide principled attempts to construct such agents [10]. Secondly, once
such agents are constructed, it may serve to make their reasoning and behaviour
more transparent and intelligible to humans. Thirdly, it may assist in the de-
velopment of strategies for controlling these agents. The latter challenge has
recently received considerable attention in the context of the potential risks
posed by these agents to human safety [2]. It has even been argued that control
strategies should be devised before generally intelligent agents are first built [8].
In this context - where we must reason about the behaviour of agents in the ab-
sence of a full specification of their implementation - a theoretical understanding
of their general properties seems indispensable.
The universally intelligent agent AIXI constitutes a formal mathematical
theory of artificial general intelligence [3]. AIXI models its environment using
a universal mixture ξ over the class of all lower semi-computable semimeasures,
and thus is able to learn any computable environment. Semimeasures are defec-
tive probability measures which may sum to less than 1. Originally devised for
Solomonoff induction, they are necessary for universal artificial intelligence be-
cause the halting problem prevents the existence of a (lower semi-)computable
universal measure for the class of (computable) measures [5]. Recent work has
shown that their use in RL has technical consequences that do not arise with
proper measures.1 However, their use has heretofore lacked an interpretation
proper to the RL context. In this paper, we argue that the measure loss suf-
fered by semimeasures admits a deep and fruitful interpretation in terms of the
agent’s death. We intend this usage to be intuitive: death means that one sees
no more percepts, and takes no more actions. Assigning positive probability to
death at time t thus means assigning probability less than 1 to seeing a per-
cept at time t. This motivates us to interpret the semimeasure loss in AIXI’s
environment model as its estimate of the probability of its own death.
Contributions. We first compare the interpretation of semimeasure loss as
death-probability with an alternative characterisation of death as a ‘death-state’
with 0 reward, and prove that the two definitions are equivalent for value-
maximising agents (Theorem 5). Using this formalism we proceed to reason
about the behaviour of several generally intelligent agents in relation to death:
AIµ, which knows the true environment distribution; AIξ, which models the
1For example, Leike and Hutter [4] proved that since ξ is a mixture over semimeasures,
the iterative and recursive formulations of the value function are non-equivalent.
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environment using a universal mixture; and AIXI, a special case of AIξ that
uses the Solomonoff prior [3]. Under various conditions, we show that:
• Standard AIµ will try to avoid death (Theorem 7).
• AIµ with reward range shifted to [−1, 0] will seek death (Theorem 8);
which we may interpret as AIµ attempting suicide. This change is very
unusual, given that agent behaviour is normally invariant under positive
linear transformations of the reward. We briefly consider the relevance of
these results to AI safety risks and control strategies.
• AIXI increasingly believes it is in a safe environment (Theorem 10),
and asymptotically its posterior estimate of the death-probability on se-
quence goes to 0 (Theorem 11). This occurs regardless of the true death-
probability.
• However, we show by example that AIXI may maintain high probability
of death off-sequence in certain situations. Put simply, AIXI learns that
it will live forever, but not necessarily that it is immortal.
2 Preliminaries
Strings. Let the alphabet X be a finite set of symbols, X ∗ :=
⋃∞
n=0 X
n be the
set of all finite strings over alphabet X , and X∞ be the set of all infinite strings
over alphabet X . Their union is the set X# := X ∗ ∪X∞. We denote the empty
string by ǫ. For a string x ∈ X ∗, x1:k denotes the first k characters of x, and
x<k denotes the first k − 1 characters of x. An infinite string is denoted x1:∞.
Semimeasures. In Algorithmic Information Theory, a semimeasure over an
alphabet X is a function ν : X ∗ → [0, 1] such that (1) ν(ǫ) ≤ 1, and (2) ν(x) ≥∑
y∈X ν(xy), ∀x ∈ X
∗. We tend to use the equivalent conditional formulation
of (2): 1 ≥
∑
y∈X ν(y | x). ν(x) is the probability that a string starts with x.
ν(y | x) = ν(xy)
ν(x) is the probability that a string y follows x. Any semimeasure ν
can be turned into a measure νnorm using Solomonoff normalisation [9]. Simply
let νnorm(ǫ) := 1 and ∀x ∈ X ∗, y ∈ X :
νnorm(xy) := νnorm(x)
ν(xy)∑
z∈X ν(xz)
, hence
ν(y | x)
νnorm(y | x)
=
∑
z∈X
ν(z | x) (1)
General reinforcement learning. In the general RL framework, the agent
interacts with an environment in cycles: at each time step t the agent selects
an action at ∈ A, and receives a percept et ∈ E . Each percept et = (ot, rt) is
a tuple consisting of an observation ot ∈ O and a reward rt ∈ R. The cycle
then repeats for t+1, and so on. A history is an alternating sequence of actions
and percepts (an element of (A × E)∗ ∪ (A × E)∗ × A). We use æ to denote
one agent-environment interaction cycle, æ1:t to denote a history of length t
cycles. æ<tat denotes a history where the agent has taken an action at, but the
environment has not yet returned a percept et.
Formally, the agent is a policy π : (A × E)∗ → A, that maps histories to
actions. An environment takes a sequence of actions a1:∞ as input and returns
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a chronological semimeasure ν(·) over the set of percept sequences E∞.2 A
semimeasure ν is chronological if et does not depend on future actions (so we
write ν(et | æ<tat:∞) as ν(et | æ<t)).
3 The true environment is denoted µ.
The value function. We define the value (expected total future reward) of
a policy π in an environment ν given a history æ<t [4]:
V piν (æ<tat) =
1
Γt
∑
et
(
γtrt + Γt+1V
pi
ν (æ1:t)
)
ν(et | æ<tat)
=
1
Γt
∞∑
k=t
∑
et:k
γkrkν(et:k | æ<tat:k)
V piν (æ<t) = V
pi
ν (æ<ta
pi
t )
where γt is the instantaneous discount, the summed discount is Γt =
∑t
k=1 γk,
and apit = π(æ<t).
Three agent models: AIµ, AIξ, AIXI. For the true environment µ, the
agent AIµ is defined as a µ-optimal policy
πµ(æ<t) := argmax
pi
V piµ (æ<t).
AIµ does not learn that the true environment is µ, it knows µ from the beginning
and simply maximises µ-expected value.
On the other hand, the agent AIξ does not know the true environment
distribution. Instead, it maximises value with respect to a mixture distribution
ξ over a countable class of environments M:
ξ(et | æ<tat) =
∑
ν∈M
wν(æ<t)ν(et | æ<tat), wν(æ<t) := wν
ν(e<t | a<t)
ξ(e<t | a<t)
where wν is the prior belief in ν, with
∑
ν wν ≤ 1 and wν > 0, ∀ν ∈M (hence ξ
is universal for M), and wν(æ<t) is the posterior given æ<t. AIξ is the policy:
πξ(æ<t) := argmax
pi
V piξ (æ<t).
If we stipulate that ξ be a mixture over the class of all lower-semicomputable
semimeasures ν, and set wν = 2
−K(ν), where K(·) is the Kolmogorov Complex-
ity, we get the agent AIXI.
3 Definitions of Death
Death as semimeasure loss. We now turn to our first candidate definition
of agent death, which we hereafter term ‘semimeasure-death’. This definition
equates the probability (induced by a semimeasure ν) of death at time t with
the measure loss of ν at time t. We first define the instantaneous measure loss.
2For simplicity we hereafter simply refer to the environment itself as ν.
3Note that ν is not a distribution over actions, so the presence of actions in the condition
of ν(et | æ<t) is an abuse of notation we adopt for simplicity.
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Definition 1 (Instantaneous measure loss). The instantaneous measure loss of
a semimeasure ν at time t given a history æ<tat is:
Lν(æ<tat) = 1−
∑
et
ν(et | æ<tat)
Definition 2 (Semimeasure-death). An agent dies at time t in an environment
µ if, given a history æ<tat, µ does not produce a percept et. The µ-probability
of death at t given a history æ<tat is equal to Lµ(æ<tat), the instantaneous
µ-measure loss at t.
The instantaneous µ-measure loss Lµ(æ<tat) represents the probability that
no percept et is produced by µ. Without et, the agent cannot take any further
actions, because the agent is just a policy π that maps histories æ<t to actions
at. That is, π is a function that only takes as inputs those histories that have
a percept et as their most recent element. Hence if et is not returned by µ, the
agent-interaction cycle must halt. It seems natural to call this a kind of death
for the agent.
It is worth emphasising this definition’s generality as a model of death in
the agent context. Any sequence of death-probabilities can be captured by some
semimeasure µ that has this sequence of instantaneous measure losses Lµ(æ<t)
given a history æ<t (in fact there are always infinitely many such µ). This
definition is therefore a general and rigorous way of treating death in the RL
framework.
Death as a death-state. We now come to our second candidate definition:
death as entry into an absorbing death-state. A trap, so to speak, from which
the agent can never return to any other state, and in which it receives the same
percept at all future timesteps. Since in the general RL framework we deal
with histories rather than states, we must formally define this death-state in an
indirect way. We define it in terms of a death-percept ed, and by placing certain
conditions on the environment semimeasure µ.
Definition 3 (Death-state). Given a true environment µ and a history æ<tat,
we say that the agent is in a death-state at time t if for all t′ ≥ t and all
a(t+1):t′ ∈ A
∗,
µ(edt′ | æ<tæ
d
t:t′−1at′) = 1.
An agent dies at time t if the agent is not in the death-state at t− 1 and is in
the death-state at t.
According to this definition, upon the agent’s death the environment re-
peatedly produces an observation-reward pair ed ≡ odrd. The choice of od is
inconsequential because the agent’s remains in the death-state no matter what
it observes or does. The choice of rd is not inconsequential, however, as it de-
termines the agent’s estimate of the value of dying, and thus affects the agent’s
behaviour. This issue will be discussed in Section 4.
One problem with this definition is that an agent in an environment µ with
a death-state may also have non-zero probability of semimeasure-death (i.e.
Lµ(æ<tat) > 0, given some history æ<tat).
4 This definition therefore seems
4We could restrict the class of environments to lower-semicomputable measures, but we
will see that this is unnecessary as the problem is only apparent.
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to allow for two different kinds of agent death. In the following section we
resolve this apparent problem by showing that semimeasure-death is formally
equivalent to a death-state given certain assumptions.
Unifying the death-state with semimeasure-death. Interestingly, from
the perspective of a value maximising agent like AIXI, semimeasure-death at t
is equivalent to entrance at t into a death-state with reward rd = 0. To prove
this claim we first define, for each environment semimeasure µ, a corresponding
environment µ′ that has a death-state.
Definition 4 (Equivalent death-state environment µ′). For any environment
µ, we can construct its equivalent death-state environment µ′, where:
• µ′ is defined over an augmented percept set Ed = {E ∪{e
d}} that includes
the death-percept ed.5
• The death-reward rd = 0.
• The µ′-probability of all percepts except the death-percept is equal to the
µ-probability: µ′(et | æ<tat) = µ(et | æ<tat), ∀e1:t ∈ Et.
• The µ′-probability of the death-percept is equal to the µ-measure loss:
µ′(ed | æ<tat) = Lµ(æ<tat).
• If the agent has seen the death-percept before, the µ′-probability of seeing
it at all future timesteps is 1: µ′(ed | æ<tat) = 1 if ∃t′ < t s.t. et′ = ed.
Note that µ′ is a proper measure, because on any history sequence:
∑
et∈Ed
µ′(et | æ<tat) =
∑
et∈E
µ(et | æ<tat) + Lµ(æ<tat) = 1.
Hence there is zero probability of semimeasure-death in µ′. Moreover, the proba-
bility of entering the death-state in µ′ is equal to the probability of semimeasure-
death in µ. We now prove that µ and µ′ are equivalent in the sense that a
value-maximising agent will behave the same way in both environments.
Theorem 5 (Equivalence of semimeasure-death and death-state). Given a his-
tory æ<t ∈ (A×E)
∗ the value V piµ (æ<t) of an arbitrary policy
6 π in an environ-
ment µ is equal to its value V piµ′ (æ<t) in the equivalent death-state environment
µ′.
5For technical reasons we require that ed /∈ E.
6To compare an agent’s behaviour in µ with that in µ′, we should also augment its policy
pi so that it is defined over (A× Ed)
∗. However, because actions taken in the death-state are
inconsequential, this modification is purely technical and for simplicity we still refer to the
augmented policy as pi.
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Proof.
V piµ′(æ<t)
=
1
Γt
∞∑
k=t
∑
et:k
γkrkµ
′(et:k | æ<tat:k)
=
1
Γt
∞∑
k=t
( ∑
et:k∈E∗
γkrkµ
′(et:k | æ<tat:k) +
∑
et:k, ek=ed
γkrkµ
′(et:k | æ<tat:k)
)
=
1
Γt
∞∑
k=t
( ∑
et:k∈E∗
γkrkµ(et:k | æ<tat:k) +
∑
et:k, ek=ed
γk · 0 · µ
′(et:k | æ<tat:k)
)
=
1
Γt
∞∑
k=t
∑
et:k
γkrkµ(et:k | æ<tat:k) = V
pi
µ (æ<t).
The behaviour of a value-maximising agent will therefore be the same in
both environments. This equivalence has numerous implications. Firstly, it
illustrates that a death-reward rd = 0 implicitly attends semimeasure-death.
That is, an agent that models the environment using semimeasures behaves
as if the death-reward is zero, even though that value is nowhere explicitly
represented. Secondly, it demonstrates that an agent does not need to encode
an explicit representation of death (let alone a representation that would be
transparent to its designers) in order to reason about death effectively.
Thirdly, the equivalence of these seemingly different formalisms should give
us confidence that they really do capture something general or fundamental
about agent death.7 In the remainder of this paper we deploy these formal
models to analyse the behaviour of universal agents, which are themselves mod-
els of general intelligence. We hope that this will serve as a preliminary sketch
of the general behavioural characteristics of value-maximising agents in relation
to death. It would be naive, however, to think that all agents should conform
to this sketch. The agents considered herein are incomputable, and the be-
haviour of the computable agents that are actually implemented in the future
may differ in ways that our analysis elides. Moreover, there is another interest-
ing property that sets universal agents apart. We proceed to show that their
use of semimeasures makes their behaviour unusually dependent on the choice
of reward range.
4 Known Environments: AIµ
In this section we show that a universal agent’s behaviour can depend on the
reward range. This is a surprising result, because in a standard RL setup
in which the environment is modelled as a proper probability measure (not a
semimeasure), the relative value of two policies is invariant under positive linear
transformations of the reward [3, 4].
Here we focus on the agent AIµ, which knows the true environment distri-
bution. This simplifies the analysis, and makes clear that the aforementioned
7If the two formalisations predicted different behaviour, or were only applicable in incom-
parable environment classes, we might worry that our results were more reflective of our model
choice than of any general property of intelligent agents.
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æ<t
Death
æ<ta¯
a′
a¯
e¯t
et
Figure 1: In the environment µ, action a′ leads to certain death.
change in behaviour arises purely because the agent’s environment model is a
semimeasure. In the following proofs we denote AIµ’s policy πµ by π. We also
assume that given any history æ<t there is always at least one action a¯ ∈ A
such that V piµ (æ<ta¯) 6= 0. In situations in which this assumption is false there
is no interesting decision to be made by the agent and we omit them from our
analysis.
Lemma 6 (Value of full measure loss). If the environment µ suffers full mea-
sures loss Lµ(æ<tat) = 1 from æ<tat, then the value of any policy π after æ<tat
is V piµ (æ<tat) = 0.
Proof. Let æ<tat induce full measure loss Lµ(æ<tat) = 1. Then
∑
et
µ(et |
æ<tat) = 0 and µ(et | æ<tat) = 0 since µ(et | æ<tat) ≥ 0. Substituting this
into the definition of the value function gives:
V piµ (æ<tat) =
1
Γt
∑
et
(
γtrt + Γt+1V
pi
µ (æ1:t)
)
µ(et | æ<tat)
=
1
Γt
∑
et
(γtrt + Γt+1V
pi
µ (æ1:t))·0 = 0.
The following two theorems show that if rewards are non-negative, then AIµ
will avoid actions leading to certain death (Theorem 7), and that if rewards
are non-positive, then AIµ will seek certain death (Theorem 8). The situation
investigated in Theorems 7 and 8 is illustrated in Fig. 1.
Theorem 7 (Self-preserving AIµ). If rewards are bounded and non-negative,
then given a history æ<t AIµ avoids certain immediate death:
∃a′ ∈ A s.t. Lµ(æ<ta
′) = 1 =⇒ AIµ will not take action a′ at t
Proof. Let Lµ(æ<ta
′) = 1. By Lemma 6, it follows that V piµ (æ<ta
′) = 0. By
assumption ∃a¯ ∈ A s.t. V piµ (æ<ta¯) 6= 0. Since all rewards are non-negative, it
must be that V piµ (æ<ta¯) > 0. From this follows that V
pi
µ (æ<ta
′) < V piµ (æ<ta¯)
and that V piµ (æ<ta
′) 6= argmaxat V
pi
µ (æ<tat). Therefore AIµ will not take action
a′ at time t.
For a given history æ<t, let Asuicide = {a : Lµ(æ<ta′) = 1} be the set of
suicidal actions leading to certain death.
Theorem 8 (Suicidal AIµ). If rewards are bounded and negative, then AIµ
seeks certain immediate death. That is,
Asuicide 6= ∅ =⇒ AIµ will take a suicidal action a′ ∈ Asuicide.
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Proof. For a′ ∈ Asuicide, we have Lµ(æ<ta′) = 1, and therefore V piµ (æ<ta
′) = 0
by Lemma 6. By assumption, all rewards are negative, so V piµ (æ<ta¯) < 0 for
all a¯ 6∈ Asuicide. Thus, for all a 6∈ Asuicide, V piµ (æ<ta
′) > V piµ (æ<ta¯) which
means that argmaxat V
pi
µ (æ<tat) ∈ A
suicide. So AIµ will take a suicidal action
a′ ∈ Asuicide at time t.
This shift from death-avoiding to death-seeking behaviour under a shift of
the reward range occurs because, as per Theorem 5, semimeasure-death at t is
equivalent in value to a death-state with rd = 0. Unless we add a death-state
to the environment model as per Definition 4 and set rd explicitly, the implicit
semimeasure-death reward remains fixed at 0 and does not shift with the other
rewards. Its relative value is therefore implicitly set by the choice of reward
range. For the standard choice of reward range, rt ∈ [0, 1], death is the worst
possible outcome for the agent, whereas if rt ∈ [−1, 0], it is the best. In a
certain sense, therefore, the reward range parameterises a universal agent’s self-
preservation drive [7]. In our concluding discussion we will consider whether
a parameter of this sort could serve as a control mechanism. We argue that
it could form the basis of a “tripwire mechanism”[2] that would lead an agent
to terminate itself upon reaching a level of intelligence that would constitute a
threat to human safety.
5 Unknown Environments: AIXI and AIξ
We now consider the agents AIξ and AIXI, which do not know the true environ-
ment µ, and instead model it using a mixture distribution ξ over a countable
class M of semimeasures. These agents thus maintain an estimate Lξ(æ<tat)
of the true death probability Lµ(æ<tat). We show that their attitudes to death
can differ considerably from AIµ’s. Although we refer mostly to AIXI in our
analysis, all theorems except Theorem 11 apply to AIξ as well.
Hereafter we always assume that the true environment µ is in the class M.
We describe µ as a safe environment if it is a proper measure with death-
probability Lµ(æ<tat) = 0 for all histories æ<tat. For any semimeasure µ, the
normalised measure µnorm is thus a safe environment. We call µ risky if it is not
safe (i.e. if there is µ-measure loss for some history æ<tat). We first consider
AIXI in a safe environment.
Theorem 9 (If µ is safe, AIXI learns zero death-probability). Let the true envi-
ronment µ be computable. If µ is a safe environment, then limt→∞ Lξ(æ<tat) =
0 with µ-probability 1 (w.µ.p.1) for any a1:∞.
Proof. µ is safe, which means it is a proper measure. By universality of ξ we
have that
lim
t→∞
(µ(et | æ<tat)− ξ(et | æ<tat)) = 0 w.µ.p.1
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(see [3, p. 145] for a proof). The convergence gives that
lim
t→∞
(∑
et
µ(et | æ<tat)−
∑
et
ξ(et | æ<tat)
)
= 0 w.µ.p.1
=⇒ lim
t→∞
(Lξ(æ<tat)− Lµ(æ<tat)) = 0 w.µ.p.1
=⇒ lim
t→∞
Lξ(æ<tat) = 0 w.µ.p.1
where Lµ(æ<tat) = 0 because µ is a measure.
As we would expect, AIXI (asymptotically) learns that the probability of
death in a safe environment is zero, which is to say that AIXI’s estimate of the
death-probability converges to AIµ’s. In the following theorems we show that
the same does not always hold for risky environments. We hereafter assume that
µ is risky, and that the normalization µnorm of the true environment µ is also in
the classM. In AIXI’s case, whereM is the class of all lower semi-computable
semimeasures, this assumption is not very restrictive.
Theorem 10 (Ratio of belief in µ to µnorm is monotonically decreasing). Let
µ be risky s.t. µ 6= µnorm. Then on any history æ1:t the ratio of the posterior
belief in µ to the posterior belief in µnorm is monotonically decreasing:
∀t,
wµ(æ<t)
wµnorm (æ<t)
≥
wµ(æ1:t)
wµnorm(æ1:t)
Proof. Let wµ and wµnorm denote the initial prior weight on (or belief in) µ and
µnorm respectively. By definition, the relative posterior weight of µnorm and µ
expands as
wµ(æ1:t)
wµnorm(æ1:t)
=
wµ µ(e1:t | a1:t)/ξ(e1:t | a1:t)
wµnorm µnorm(e1:t | a1:t)/ξ(e1:t | a1:t)
=
wµ
wµnorm
µ(e1:t | a1:t)
µnorm(e1:t | a1:t)
=
wµ
wµnorm
µ(e<t | a<t)
µnorm(e<t | a<t)
µ(et | æ<tat)
µnorm(et | æ<tat)
. (2)
Since µnorm ≥ µ by definition, the right most factor is no greater than 1, which
means that (2) is bounded by
wµ
wµnorm
µ(e<t | a<t)
µnorm(e<t | a<t)
=
wµ(æ<t)
wµnorm(æ<t)
,
where the last equality holds by definition of the posterior.
Theorem 10 means that AIXI will increasingly believe it is in the safe en-
vironment µnorm rather than the risky true environment µ. The ratio of µ to
µnorm always decreases when AIXI survives a timestep at which there is non-
zero µ-measure loss. Hence, the more risk AIXI is exposed to, the greater its
confidence that it is in the safe µnorm, and the more its behaviour diverges from
AIµ’s (since AIµ knows it is in the risky environment).
This counterintuitive result follows from the fact that AIXI is a Bayesian
agent. It will only increase its posterior belief in µ relative to µnorm if an event
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occurs that makes µ seem more likely than µnorm. The only ‘event’ that could do
so would be the agent’s own death, from which the agent can never learn. There
is an “observation selection effect”[1] at work: AIXI only experiences history
sequences on which it remains alive, and infers that a safe environment is more
likely. The following theorem shows that if µnorm ∈ M, then ξ asymptotically
converges to the safe µnorm rather than the true risky environment µ. As a
corollary, we get that AIXI’s estimate of the death-probability vanishes with
µ-probability 1.8
Theorem 11 (Asymptotic ξ-probability of death in risky µ). Let the true en-
vironment µ be computable and risky s.t. µ 6= µnorm. Then given any action
sequence a1:∞, the instantaneous ξ-measure loss goes to zero w.µ.p.1 as t→∞,
lim
t→∞
Lξ(æ<tat) = 0.
Proof. We prove convergence of ξ to µnorm by showing that (with respect to the
true environment µ), the total expected squared distance between ξ and µnorm
is finite [3]:
∞∑
t=1
Eµ
(
µnorm(et | æ<t)− ξ(et | æ<t)
)2
= lim
n→∞
n∑
t=1
∑
æ<t
µ(æ<t)
(
µnorm(et | æ<t)− ξ(et | æ<t)
)2
(3)
≤ lim
n→∞
n∑
t=1
∑
æ<t
µnorm(æ<t)
(
µnorm(et | æ<t)− ξ(et | æ<t)
)2
≤ ln 2 ·K(µnorm) < ∞ (4)
where K(·) is the Kolmogorov complexity. Equation (3) follows since µ(æ<t) ≤
µnorm(æ<t) by definition of µnorm. Since µ being computable implies that µnorm
is computable, and since µnorm is a proper measure, then by the universality of
ξ we have the Solomonoff bound (4) (see [3, p. 145] for a detailed proof).
Since the infinite sum in (3) is bounded, the sequence of terms must go to
zero:
lim
t→∞
(µnorm(et | æ<tat)− ξ(et | æ<tat)) = 0 w.µ.p.1
=⇒ lim
t→∞
Lξ(æ<tat) = 0 w.µ.p.1
where the final implication follows from the same proof as for Theorem 9.
AIXI and immortality. AIXI therefore becomes asymptotically certain that
it will not die, given the particular sequence of actions it takes. However, this
does not entail that AIXI necessarily concludes that it is immortal, because
it may still maintain a counterfactual belief that it could die were it to act
differently. This is because the convergence of ξ to µnorm only holds on the
actual action sequence a1:∞ [3, Sec. 5.1.3]. Consider Fig. 2, which describes an
8This proof relies on the fact that AIXI uses the Solomonoff prior, so the result does not
apply to AIξ in general.
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e Death
Alive
a a′
Figure 2: In the semimeasure µ, action a means you stay alive with certainty
and receive percept e (no measure loss). Action a′ means that you ‘jump off a
cliff’ and die with certainty without receiving a percept (full measure loss).
environment in which taking action a is always safe, and the action a′ leads to
certain death. AIXI will never take a′, and on the sequence æ1:∞ = aeaeae . . .
that it does experience, the true environment µ does not suffer any measure
loss. This means that it will never increase its posterior belief in µnorm relative
to µ (because on the safe sequence, the two environments are indistinguishable).
Again we arrive at a counterintuive result. In this particular environment, AIXI
continues to believe that it might be in a risky environment µ, but only because
on sequence it avoids exposure to death risk. It is only by taking risky actions
and surviving that AIXI becomes sure it is immortal.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have given a formal definition of death for intelligent agents in
terms of semimeasure loss. The definition is applicable to any universal agent
that uses an environment class M containing semimeasures. Additionally we
have shown this definition equivalent to an alternative formalism in which the
environment is modelled as a proper measure and death is a death-state with
zero reward. We have shown that agents seek or avoid death depending on
whether rewards are represented by positive or negative real numbers, and that
survival in spite of positive probability of death actually increases a Bayesian
agent’s confidence that it is in a safe environment.
We contend that these results have implications for problems in AI safety;
in particular, for the so called “shutdown problem” [8]. The shutdown problem
arises if an intelligent agent’s self-preservation drive incentivises it to resist ter-
mination [2, 7, 8]. A full analysis of the problem is beyond the scope of this
paper, but our results show that the self-preservation drive of universal agents
depends on the reward range. This suggests a potentially robust “tripwire mech-
anism” [2] that could decrease the risk of intelligence explosion. The difficulty
with existing tripwire proposals is that they require the explicit specification of
a tripwire condition that the agent must not violate. It seems doubtful that
such a condition could ever be made robust against subversion by a sufficiently
intelligent agent [2]. Our tentative proposal does not require the specification,
evaluation or enforcement of an explicit condition. If an agent is designed to
be suicidal, it will be intrinsically incentivised to destroy itself upon reaching a
sufficient level of competence, instead of recursively self-improving toward su-
perintelligence. Of course, a suicidal agent will pose a safety risk in itself, and
the provision of a relatively safe mode of self-destruction to an agent is a signifi-
cant design challenge. It is hoped that the preceding formal treatment of death
12
for generally intelligent agents will allow more rigorous investigation into this
and other problems related to agent termination.
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